Executive compensation is said to be for performance and, in liberal market economies, the board of directors along with compensation committees have largely been in charge of safeguarding pay for performance. This executive compensation system is legally protected by the business judgment rule (a strong judicial deference) and has recently been supplemented with shareholders' 'say on pay'. Further legal or government intervention has been deemed unnecessary. However, such system has resulted in extremely excessive executive compensation, outrageous pay disparities between executives and workers, poor or short-term performance, recurrent corporate failures and economic recession. This paper explores the need for a stronger legal intervention and argues that directors, in exercising their fiduciary duties, should be legally required to tie executive compensation to the long-term sustainability of the firm that in turn requires the use of executive pay to promote not only sustained growth and long-term shareholder value but also steady improvements in the interests of multiple stakeholders involved in the long-term success of the company, notably employees. It is further argued that, in liberal market economies, employees' 'say on pay' should be considered as it is crucial to allow employees to communicate their interests in order both to incorporate them in the metric of long-term firm sustainability and to counter the likely opposition from short-term oriented shareholders and self-serving directors and officers. This proposal will contribute to avoiding excessive pay and short-termism and to promoting long-term firm performance, which will ultimately protect shareholders and employees' interest in job security, fair and sustainable wages and secured pension while creating more stable economies and avoiding citizens subsidizing periodic corporate failures, excessive executive pay and the wealth accumulation plans of an elite shareholder class. The paper briefly analyzes whether directors have a duty to tie executive pay to long-term performance in the US and Canada and develops the argument building on the lessons that can be drawn from the 2009 German VorstAG (the Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Remuneration) and the 2015 German Corporate Governance Code.
A common and well-accepted guiding principle within executive compensation theories is that the compensation paid to executives should be rigidly tied to the long-term sustainability of the firm. The intension of this approach is to encourage long-term oriented thinking and decision making which does not allow much room for excessive risk taking and a lack of sustainability which has characterized the conduct of some industries with excessive executive compensation such as the financial industry in the United States. However, the reality of executive compensation too often diverges from this principle.
This essay explores the legal and regulatory avenues which could be utilized to enforce more reasonable and sustainable executive compensation regimes in North American corporations.
Specifically, it argues that directors, in exercising their fiduciary duties, should be legally required to tie executive compensation to the long-term sustainability of the firm. In so doing, directors may be required to use of executive pay to promote not only sustained growth and long-term shareholder value but also steady improvements in the interests of multiple stakeholders involved in the long-term success of the company, notably employees. It is further argued that, in liberal market economies, employees' 'say on pay' should be considered as it is crucial to allow employees to communicate their interests in order both to incorporate them in the metric of longterm firm sustainability and to counter the likely opposition from short-term oriented shareholders and self-serving directors and officers. American context. A central idea this essay will examine is that the VorstAG's expansion of regulation surrounding the substance of executive compensation. This discussion highlights the imposition of a legal responsibility on directors to ensure "reasonable" compensation is a rule, which would have significant mileage in North America in altering the commitment and conduct of executives to the long-term sustainability of the firm. This paper will begin by outlining the contemporary nature of disproportionate executive compensation schemes in North America, subsequently situating this discussion across the North American economy as a whole. In order to contextualize notions of executive compensation, a discussion on the theory and soundness of our guiding principle of executive compensation will illuminate the connection between compensation and long-term sustainability. These foundational descriptions and theories will then be followed by a thorough analysis of the German VortAG law and the implications of its institution in North America. This section will also provide a brief review of the legal framework for fiduciary duties of directors and long-term executive pay in the US and Canada. Finally, the essay will propose some ideas for developing a fiduciary duty of directors to tie executive compensation to long-term firm sustainability in liberal market economies and highlight some of the challenges that such reform would face in its possible implementation.
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CRISIS
The current regulatory schemes governing executive compensation in North America are unsustainable and are conducive to unsustainable markets, industries, and the widening of wealth inequality. In Canada, the average CEO in 2014 earned roughly 206 times as much as the average worker while in the United States the average CEO earns roughly 354 times that of the average worker.
3 Such wildly high compensation rates have two major negative effects within the economy: the incentivization of risky behaviour and the widening of wealth inequality. Both of these negative effects harm the prospects for the average North American to succeed in the economy.
Excessive executive compensation has the effect of incentivizing excessive risk taking behaviour on the part of executives whose compensation is determined using short-term based metrics which do not pay heed to the long-term sustainability of executive action. 4 This can be seen most poignantly in the example of the U.S financial crisis where the executives of top investment banks as Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan engaged in wildly excessive risk taking by expanding the sub-prime mortgage bubble whose burst, consequently, sparked the 2008 Great
Recession. For these companies, the executive compensation structures were such that short-term minded thinking and behaviour was incentivized since short-term increases in the stock price of the firm was the prime metric by which most executive compensation was awarded. between executive and the pay of average workers. 10 The effects of troubling rates of wealth inequality include social unrest, rising crime rates, and a lack of public trust in institutions and the government.
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The solution to fixing an executive compensation regime which rewards short-term thinking and increases in stock prices, and shields executives from the long-term consequences of their decisions is seemingly simple. It requires abiding by the guiding principle mentioned in the introduction of this essay which is to link the long-term consequences of executive decisions to the personal wealth of these executives. This practices needs to ensure that the executives do 7 not receive compensation premised on short-term increases in stock price or compensation that is bloated thus contributing to further wealth inequality. Many theorists of executive compensation agree that compensation should revolve around notions of long-term performance in order to reduce risk taking on the part of executives who judge success (and thus their compensation) on the short-term performance of the firm's stock value. 12 This flawed focus on a firm's short-term stock price is detrimental and is conducive to reckless risk-taking. As Roger Martin of the University of Toronto argues, it rewards executives on a manufactured value, that of the stock price rather than the value of the company in the "real market" which is "the market where revenues are earned expenses paid and real dollars of profit show up on the bottom line."
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Success in this real market necessitates a long-term outlook and sustainable business decisions and often reflect themselves in the long-term value of the stock rather than its short term value.
14 Reforming executive pay to incentivize a focus on the long-term performance of the firm, and thus its success in the real economy as opposed to the stock market-though success therein often still translates to success in the stock market-requires reducing excessive risk taking.
This reduction can be realized by ensuring that executives are incentivized to do what is best for their personal wealth, the fate of which would be inexorably linked to the real success of the company in the long-term. This principle also has benefits with regards to encouraging corporate and industrial order as incentivizing long-term oriented thinking aligns executive and shareholder interests, thus helping to ensure that the executive boards of companies fulfill their duties under those whom they operate the corporation for, shareholders and non-shareholder 8 stakeholders. Furthermore, following this principle of executive compensation has beneficial impacts with regards to corporate social responsibility. Studies show that there is a positive correlation between long-term performance compensation and the firm's sensitivities to their greater impacts on the environment. 15 One of the reasons for this positive correlation is because incentives which focus on long-term outcomes necessitate, on the part of the firm's executives, a commitment to producing quality products and a proactive environmental stance which increases the likelihood of the firm's long-term sustainability and profitability.
The question now turns to the main objective of this essay which is to analyze the reformation of executive compensation through a regulatory based expansion of legal burdens upon executives to institute long-term oriented compensation. The two main parts of this reform structure are the utilization of regulatory principles and legal frameworks to force directors to award long-term oriented and sustainable executive compensation. These principles and structures will pay particular attention to the German VorstAG regulatory model and will address how a legal duty to force executives to tie the long-term sustainability of their firm to their executive compensation would operate in liberal market economies like the US and Canada.
Through the reformation of the regulatory structure of executive compensation laws, directors'
and officers' fiduciary duty will also be strengthened and forced to be exercised more responsibly since there would be an increase of legal liability for company directors should they award compensation contrary to the company's long-term interest. 16 These reforms thus force 9 directors and executives to award compensation tied to the company's long-term interest.
Without reformation to the current executive compensation practices, the correlation between short-term oriented praxis of business strategies and potential harm to corporations and the economy as a whole, will be perpetuated due to this lack of accountability from the decisionmakers.
THE DUTY OF DIRECTORS TO TIE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TO THE LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF THE FIRM IN GERMANY
Germany has recently introduced legal reforms to require the tying of executive compensation to the long-term sustainability of the firm while setting standards that this compensation must meet according to the new regulatory framework. 17 The Vorstandsvergütung- 
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There are three key ways that the VorstAG ties the long-term sustainability of the firm to the compensation paid to executives. The first is perhaps the most often cited and praised reform, which requires that the executive compensation awarded by the supervisory board be appropriate.
The criteria for determining the appropriateness of compensation are the actual responsibilities and performance of the executives and the company's current financial situation. 25 The compensation must be proportional to the executive's duties and cannot be unreasonable in light of the company's "general economic situation". 26 This rule also requires that the compensation accords with industry standards and that the compensation in the case of publically listed companies should be oriented towards the long-term sustainability of the firm. 27 The law itself specifically states that "the remuneration system of listed companies shall be aimed at the company's sustainable development "and the "calculation basis of variable remuneration components should therefore be several years long." 28 The Supervisory Board is even allowed to reduce executive remuneration if the situation of the company deteriorates over time. 29 The VorstAG amended Section 87 of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz; "AktG") in order to specifically define the notion of "appropriateness" of management board compensation. remuneration bears a reasonable relationship to the duties and performance of such member as well as the condition of the company and that it does not exceed standard remuneration without any particular reasons. The remuneration system of listed companies shall be aimed at the company's sustainable development. The calculation basis of variable remuneration components should therefore be several years long; in case of extraordinary developments, the supervisory board shall agree on a possibility of remuneration limitation. Sentence 1 shall apply analogously to pensions, payments to surviving dependents and similar payments.
(2) If the situation of the company deteriorates after the determination so that a continued payment of remuneration under (1) would be unreasonable for the company, the supervisory board or, in case of § 85 (3), the court upon petition of the supervisory board shall reduce remuneration to a reasonable level. Pensions, payments to surviving dependents and similar payments may only be reduced pursuant to sentence 1 within the first three years after resignation from the company. Such reduction shall not affect the other terms of the contract of employment. The member of the management board may terminate, however, his contract of employment as of the end of the next calendar quarter upon giving six weeks' notice.
30
The Supervisory Board members are subject to liability if they fail to set a compensation that is not consistent with the sustainability of the company. The total compensation of the individual members of the Management Board is determined by the entire Supervisory Board in plenary session at an appropriate amount based on a performance assessment, taking into consideration any payments by group companies. Criteria for determining the appropriateness of compensation are both the tasks of the individual member of the Management Board, his/her personal performance, the economic situation, the performance and outlook of the enterprise as well as the common level of the compensation taking into account the peer companies and the compensation structure in place in other areas of the company. The Supervisory Board shall consider the relationship between the compensation of the Management Board and that of senior management and the staff overall, particularly in terms of its development over time, whereby the Supervisory Board shall determine how senior managers and the relevant staff are to be differentiated. … 4.2.3 … The compensation structure must be oriented toward sustainable growth of the enterprise. The monetary compensation elements shall comprise fixed and variable elements. The Supervisory Board must make sure that the variable compensation elements are in general based on a multi-year assessment. Both positive and negative developments shall be taken into account when determining variable compensation components. All compensation components must be appropriate, both individually and in total, and in particular must not encourage to take unreasonable risks. The amount of compensation shall be capped, both overall and for individual compensation components. The variable compensation components shall be related to demanding, relevant comparison parameters. deviate from the recommendations (marked by the use of the word "shall"), but are then obliged to disclose it and to justify the deviations (comply or explain).
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The German Sustainability Code (GSC), introduced in 2012, further recommends that companies link executive compensation with sustainability:
Incentive Schemes 8. The company discloses how target agreements and remuneration schemes for executives are also geared to achieving the sustainability goals and how these are geared towards lasting value creation. It discloses the extent to which sustainability performance forms 39 Id at 6-8. 40 Commission, REGIERUNGSKOMMISSION DEUTSCHER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX, available at: http://www.dcgk.de/en/commission.html 41 The Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, supra note. 42 Id, Introduction at 2.
16 part of the evaluation of the top management (board/managing directors) conducted by the monitoring body (supervisory board/advisory board).
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Defining long-term firm sustainability is crucial to ascertain the scope of the duty of the Supervisory Board to tie executive compensation to the sustainable growth of enterprises. In expounding on the definition of "sustainability" that informs section 87(1), Marburg writes that the definition comes from European environmental law, and that within the business context it relates to the understanding that corporate executives should not pursue short-term interests and that they should not be rewarded for any short-term benefits that come at the long-term expense of the company. 44 This understanding of sustainability relies on a conception of steady and planned growth that is not relying on windfall profits or anything equally impermanent and unstable. Thus ex ante prosperity is not necessarily needed to be elemental to executive success in this regard.
Planned sustainability will suffice as deserving of adequate compensation. 45 According to German scholars writing on the VorstAG, when analyzing executive success, the focus on sustainability partly manifests itself through a conception of success that considers the furtherance of "complimentary company business decisions objectives such as safeguarding employment, raising profits and increasing market shares" as objectives deserving of adequate compensation." 46 Moreover, it can be argued that the stakeholder orientation of the German corporate governance system along with co-determination favors a conception of long-term firm sustainability that incorporates multiple stakeholders' interest. This is further reinforced by the 43 The German Sustainability Code, Recommendations of the German Council for Sustainable Development, Text no. 41, January 2012, available at http://www.nachhaltigkeitsrat.de/uploads/media/RNE_The_German_Sustainability_Code_GSC_text_No_41_Januar y_2012.pdf. 44 Marburg, supra note 20, at 23. 45 Id. at 24. 46 Id. at 10.
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belief that the success and long-term sustainability of companies also depend on the contribution of multiple stakeholders such as employees, customers, creditors and suppliers. The interests of stakeholder are also captured and promoted by sustainability objectives and it is thus reasonable to assume that the assessment of long-term firm sustainability is to be informed by the larger objective of sustainability in Germany. The GSC provides the following definition of sustainability which is at the basis of its recommendation that executive pay should aim to achieve sustainability:
What is sustainability? "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. [...] In essence, sustainable development is a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations." Brundtland-Commission 1987.
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Pay for long-term firm sustainability ties the consequences of executive performance to their personal wealth, thereby encouraging long-term minded thinking. 48 Compensation packages cannot be structured to be outrageously high, especially in dire economic circumstances, and they cannot be structured to reward or incentivize short-term minded behaviour and excessive risk taking since these are not conducive to a company's sustainable development. Importantly, compensation must be calculated with a mind towards the mitigation of risky executive behaviour and the promotion of sustainable growth. The conception of long-term firm sustainability should inform the use and reform of compensation instruments. The latter are important because they give effect to the principle of appropriate and long-term oriented compensation. VorstAG in their shareholder meetings or proxy statements, and structured their compensation regime in terms emphasizing sustainability and appropriateness.
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The second key reform instituted by the VorstAG also relates to the use of claw-backs. In the event that the compensation paid to an executive becomes unsustainable in the future (because of new information emerging or a financial hit to the company), the VorstAG legally requires that courts (upon petition of the supervisory board) exercise claw-back measures to retrieve compensation that was undeservingly paid to an executive. 53 This practice is regardless of whether or not such a claw-back provision is explicitly in the employment contract. This claw-back provision also applies to executive pensions and payments to dependents within the first three years of the executive leaving the company. Such praxis strongly encourages executives to pay heed to the long-term because it forces them to engage in suitable business decisions that will continue to both maintain a soundness of practice as well as foster future soundness of practices.
By facilitating a shift from short-term to long-term mentality of business praxis, executives are forced into the position where they must examine their person wealth and the consequences that their business decisions have both inside and outside of the parameters of their employment with the company.
The third key reform by the VorstAG is the introduction of a non-binding "say on pay vote." In accordance with one of the aims of the VorstAG, which is to strengthen transparency within the executive board room, the VorstAG requires a non-binding "say on pay" vote by the shareholder assembly on the compensation to be awarded. 54 Section 120 of the AktG indicates that shareholders may have a say on executive compensation decisions but this does not affect the powers of the Supervisory Board to determine the compensation of the Management Board members:
Section120 Ratification of the Acts of Management; Vote on the Compensation Scheme … (4) The shareholders' meeting of a listed company may resolve on the approval of the compensation scheme. The resolution shall not give rise to any rights or obligations; in particular, the obligations of the supervisory board pursuant to § 87 shall remain unaffected. The resolution shall not be voidable pursuant to § 243.
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Say on pay votes can encourage long-term oriented compensation packages through two routes. Firstly, it requires corporations to justify their compensation packages to shareholders which forces the supervisory board to propose appropriate compensation packages that will be defensible in front of shareholders, 56 including its consistency with the legally required longterm sustainability of the firm as established by Section 87 of the AktG. Secondly, it allows longterm oriented shareholders, such as pension funds, to voice their opinion regarding compensation and demand compensation that is appropriate given the financial situation of the company and its long-term outlook. 57 In discussing the "say on pay" provision of the VorstAG, Martin VesperGraske says that it was intended to further fulfill the VorstAG's guiding principle of tying longterm sustainability to executive remuneration. 58 In these instances the law was designed to 
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facilitate the remuneration committee to collectively make a decision, but also force the committee into a position whereby they must suggest compensation that is justifiable to begin with so that the shareholders can be satisfied that the compensation is appropriate. The law is also meant to publicize shareholder denials of executive compensation regimes in order to bring negative publicity, thus encouraging the initial proposal of appropriate compensation that will be approved by shareholders.
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All of these new regulations introduced by the VorstAG carry the full strength of the law.
Section 116 of the Aktiengesetz, or the German Stock Corporation Act (of which the VorstAG is embedded within) states that the paying of "unreasonable compensation" makes Supervisory
Board members liable to damages if they determine unreasonable executive compensation. Setting a legal standard for an appropriate executive remuneration along with a director liability, clawback provisions and non-binding say on pay represent a significant legal intervention to restrain managerial power in deciding executive pay and steer compensation towards the long-term interest of companies. The VorstAG is thus a very serious regulatory framework that alters the duty of directors to their firm and its long-term outlook in a way that is meant to operate that duty more effectively
The VorstAG has had a reasonable amount of success in Germany where corporate conversations about compensation are longer and more in-depth than in the past as executive boards have attempted to propose compensation in line with the requirements of the law. At the very least, they have tried to use the language of "sustainability" in justifying their compensation packages which has the potential to encourage actual compensation structures in line with the 59 Id at 765.
principles of the VorstAG. 60 Of course, it is still too early to make a judgment regarding whether the VorstAG can be said to have directly contributed to increased sustainability within German companies and the economy, although current indications suggest a positive outcome in this regard. 61 The VorstAG thus shows that a regulatory model which enshrines certain principles and practices can have significant impact on executive compensation and can therefore stand as a lesson for North American discussions regarding the reforming of executive compensation.
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS, EXECUTIVE PAY AND LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE IN THE US AND CANADA
There is only limited potential for American courts to enforce a duty to pay more reasonable compensation through fiduciary duty due to the business judgment rule. provisions once instituted and enforced by the SEC, will be able to succeed where the other legislation has failed. However, currently, the extent to which American claw-back provisions impose a duty on directors to tie executive compensation with long-term sustainability is extremely limited, and it is evident that even where a legal duty theoretically exists, it is not operating to change executive behaviour because of a lack of enforcement.
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The regulatory structure in this regard is similar in Canada, where no federal or provincial regulations demand that executive compensation be reasonable in the same manner as Germany.
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There is, however, in Canada some court decisions which use the principle of fiduciary duty and the oppression remedy to limit outrageous remuneration by holding that the paying of such compensation, especially in dire economic circumstances, is contrary to shareholder interests. corporation is an ongoing concern, it looks to the long-term interests of the corporation" 82 . It can then be argued that directors in exercising their fiduciary duties while making decisions such as setting executive compensation may look to the interest of multiple stakeholders and look to the long-term performance of their companies. Directors thus appear to have a duty to assess the extent to which executive compensation serves long-term firm performance. This is an implication that derives from BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders 83 and will however need both clearer future pronouncements by Canadian courts and a significant compliance by corporate directors to more conclusively state that directors have a duty to tie executive compensation to the long-term performance of companies in Canada.
Increasingly, in the pension fund context, Canadian pension trustees are legally required to look to "longer-term, systemic concerns, such as intergenerational equity and sustainable development" and take into consideration "how their investment decisions will affect the stability of financial systems, the direction of the economy and the sustainability of our environment". 84 As part of such long-term objectives, pension trustees should thus be required to make investment decisions that advance the long-term sustainability of the companies in which pension funds invest.
To this end, Canadian pension trustees appear to be required to promote executive compensation policies that are instrumental to the long-term sustainability of the companies in which they invest and to the economy. This was clearly recommended by the European Commission in its 2009
Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial Services Sector. 85 The
Commission recommended that financial institutions, including pension funds, should adopt remuneration policies that are aligned with long-term interests and sustainable growth of companies.
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There are no Canadian regulations that require companies to have or use claw-back provisions. Although their use has become more popular in Canada over the past two years, it is still entirely voluntary. 87 Stephen C. Caywood argues that claw-back provisions can be a highly effective tool to incentivize long-term minded behaviour. When executives understand that the actions for which they receive bonuses or other variable compensation may have long-term negative and unsustainable consequences which may cause their compensation to be clawed back, they will be strongly incentivized to engage in wise long-term minded behaviour. 88 The current non-mandatory nature of claw-backs further diminishes the ability of executive pay to promote long-term oriented compensation structure in Canada.
This lack of a clear legal duty to tie executive compensation to companies' long-term interest has been evident in the misalignment between executive pay practices and long-term firm performance in the years after the 
DEVELOPING A DUTY OF DIRECTORS TO TIE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TO LONG-TERM FIRM PERFORMANCE IN LIBERAL MARKET ECONOMIES
The need to pay executives for long-term performance has become a widely-held view and a fiduciary duty of directors to tie executive compensation to the long-term interest of companies is instrumental to that objective as our review of Germany's executive pay laws demonstrate. Such a duty sets an executive pay standard requiring a shift from short-termism to the long-term sustainability of the firm while legally moderating excessive executive compensation and controlling the power of managers to inflate their salaries.
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In determining executive pay for long-term performance, the latter should not solely be measured by increases in stock value over the long-run or long-term shareholder value as Romano 97 This is of course difficult to quantify and will require a complex metric beyond the hard numerical data of stock value in order to measure future improvements in multiple stakeholders' interests. 98 Simple metrics that include basic indicators of wage developments over time, investments in training and skill development and the environmental impact of corporate activity over the long-run may be more realistic and easily implementable. The assessment of this long-term multi-stakeholder performance should be set in a multi-year framework of, for example, three to five years. 99 In factoring employees' interest in long-term firm sustainability, directors should also tie executive compensation to steady improvements in working conditions including sustainable wages, job security, training and skill development, healthy and safe work environments as well as in employee productivity, job satisfaction, innovation and loyalty. Needless to say, these conditions and economic goals associated with employee welfare and performance are vital for the short-term success and the long-term sustainability of companies. Healthy, skillful, productive, fairly satisfied and committed workers is a critical factor in creating productive, innovative and growing companies in the short and long-term. 100 The 2012 German Sustainability Code (GSC) sheds further light on the possible metric of employees' interest that directors can use when setting executive compensation for long-term firm sustainability. Section 8 of the German Sustainability
Code recommends that companies develop executive remuneration policies that are geared towards the larger objective of sustainability. 101 This is important because the success and longterm sustainability of companies also depend on the contribution of multiple stakeholders (including employees) whose interests are precisely promoted by sustainability objectives. Thus, the assessment of pay for long-term firm sustainability should also be informed by expectations of sustainability as applied to companies. The GSC considers employee rights and diversity as an important part of sustainability. As such, the GSC recommends:
Employee Rights and Diversity payment of bonuses is spread over the business cycle of the company", Official Journal of the European Union 15. employees are also represented in the Supervisory Board and control one third or one half of the seats in enterprises having more than 500 or 2,000 employees respectively. 104 Employees are then influential in the Supervisory Board decisions including the determination of long-term oriented executive compensation and will subsequently tend to promote firm sustainability and a metric thereof that includes their interest in fair and sustainable working conditions. This is consistent with Germany's co-determination system that has historically been committed to promote multiple stakeholders' interest and the VorstAG is embedded in such stakeholder culture and thus requires that long-term executive compensation considers the interests of not only shareholders but also of employees, creditors, suppliers and other non-shareholder stakeholders. 172. Duty to promote the success of the company (1)A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to-
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(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the interests of the company's employees, (c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, (d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment, (e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.
increasing opposition of short-term oriented shareholders and self-serving directors and officers 109 to long-term performance and its responsiveness to stakeholders' interest and employees' interest in particular. 110 Even when long-term executive compensation plans are apparently adopted, companies are reluctant and do not effectively execute them. This current problem appears to be an old practice. Studies done in 1990s show how long-term oriented compensation plan are often symbolically adopted by corporations, to the positive reaction of the market, without those plans actually being implemented. 111 Implementing a duty to tie executive compensation to long-term performance may be challenging in the presence of strong shareholder primacy culture that is still prevalent in countries like the US and Canada.
The benefits of an effective implementation of a fiduciary duty to tie executive compensation to the long-term sustainability of companies that is sensitive to non-shareholder stakeholders' interest would be considerable and would not be restricted to the company. It is likely to have a significant positive impact on multiple stakeholders, societal equality and the sustainability of the economy. This is important because it will not only secure corporate success and benefit investors, but it will also help protect employees' interest in job security, fair and Further research to analyze the prospects of a duty to tie executive compensation to the long-term sustainability of companies is needed. It would be important, for example, to discuss the content of variable compensation instruments and the extent to which such instruments effectively serve the long-term interest of companies and whether they are able to capture multiple stakeholders' interests including employees' interest. Furthermore, the enforcement and impact of such a duty are likely to face significant barriers from short-term oriented shareholders and selfserving directors and officers and it is important to identify obstacles and explore conditions that would facilitate an effective implementation of such a duty. For example, it would be possible to counter resistance to such a duty through the increased involvement of long-term oriented shareholders who have a specific interest in the paying of long-term oriented compensation.
Specifically, institutional investors such as union and pension fund shareholders could prove to be a key ally in helping the consolidation of any substantive regulatory reform of the kind that is being proposed. 113 These types of investors could counter the voice of other more short-term oriented investors and stakeholders, and through a 'say on pay' vote, the voice of these long-term oriented shareholders could have an appropriate outlet to enforce their interests and concerns. With the 112 Even authors that advocate pay for long-term performance that is mainly measured in terms of long-term shareholder value have highlighted the importance of long-term executive compensation reforms for preventing the waste of public resources in bailing out failing companies. See Bhagat & Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Simplicity, Transparency and Committing to the Long-Term, supra note (claiming that "By reducing management incentive to take on unwarranted risk, our proposal would therefore also decrease the probability that public resources will be dissipated in bailouts of financial firms, particularly those deemed by public officials as "too big to fail."") 113 Yonca Ertimur, et al, Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, 24 (2) REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES (2011). For example, CalPERS, the largest pension fund in the US, has indicated that it has adopted principles that reflect each Board member's commitment to a long-term view of the needs of beneficiaries and system participants, among other things. See CalPERS, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/organization/board/02152012-boardgovernance.pdf.
38 current realities of corporate excess and wealth inequality, and indications that the regulatory structure which allowed the 2008 recession have not been significantly altered to prevent another major crash, it is of utmost necessity that comprehensive reform initiatives, such as ones inspired by the VorstAG are seriously considered and analyzed thoroughly for their potential ability to provide a more sound and sustainable corporate regulatory regime.
CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed the merits of a fiduciary duty of directors to tie executive compensation to the long-term sustainability of the firm drawing on the insights of a comparative study of the regulation of executive pay in Germany, the US and Canada. While the duty to tie executive pay to long-term performance is not clearly established in the US and Canada and is largely a voluntary practice, Germany introduced the 2009 German VorstAG (the "Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Remuneration) which clearly requires Supervisory Boards to set executive compensation with aim of the sustainable growth of companies. Building on the lessons that can be drawn from the 2009 German VorstAG, it was argued that directors should be legally required to tie executive compensation to the long-term firm sustainability that in turn requires a metric that balances sustained growth and long-term shareholder value with steady improvements in the interests of multiple stakeholders involved in the long-term success of the company. The paper focused on employees' long-term interest and its inclusion in the assessment of the long-term sustainability of companies. It was further argued that, in liberal market economies, employees' 'say on pay' should be given significant consideration as it will allow employees to communicate their interests in order both to incorporate them in the metric of long-39 term firm sustainability and to control the likely opposition from short-term oriented shareholders and self-serving directors and officers. The benefits of this proposal are significant as it will ultimately protect shareholders and employees' interest in job security, fair and sustainable wages and secured pension while creating more stable economies and avoiding citizens subsidizing periodic corporate failures, excessive executive pay and the wealth accumulation plans of an elite shareholder class.
It is important to further explore the content and implementation of the duty to tie executive compensation to long-term firm sustainability in future research. Developing a more detailed metric of long-term firm sustainability that captures multiple stakeholders' interests and compensation instruments that are consistent with that metric appears to be the next step in this line of research. Furthermore, the enforcement and impact of such a duty are likely to face significant barriers from short-term oriented shareholders and self-serving directors and officers and it is thus critical to identify obstacles and explore conditions that would facilitate an effective implementation of such a duty.
